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CLASS CERTIFICATION’S PRECLUSIVE EFFECTS

KEVIN M. CLERMONT

†

In September 2010, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the controversial Baycol litigation. The central question will be whether, subsequent to a
denial of class certification, preclusion can prevent an absentee from seeking to
certify another class action on a similar claim. This Essay answers that question in the affirmative, while warning that the preclusion is very limited in
scope. It arrives at this answer by analogizing to the more established doctrine
of jurisdiction to determine no jurisdiction: if a court’s finding of no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the person can preclude, then a finding of no authority to proceed as a class action should be preclusive—but only on that precise issue of no authority.
INTRODUCTION
A federal court denies certification of a plaintiff class action, thereby declaring the absentees to be nonparties. One of those absentees
then brings a class action on a similar claim in a different jurisdiction
with an identical class action rule, provoking the common defendant
to invoke res judicata. Is the issue of certifiability subject to collateral
1
2
estoppel? Academics might answer “no,” on the ground that res ju†

Ziff Professor of Law, Cornell University. Thanks to Mike Dorf, Andrew Pollis,
and Jay Tidmarsh for valuable comments.
1
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982) (stating the general rule
of issue preclusion). The cases speak only of collateral estoppel, but direct estoppel
might be a more appropriate term here, as a certifiability issue will already have been
litigated with respect to the same claim. See id. § 17 cmt. c, § 27 cmt. b. Better yet, as
this Essay argues, one might invoke the separate res judicata doctrine called jurisdiction to determine no jurisdiction. See Kevin M. Clermont, Sequencing the Issues for Judi-
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3

dicata normally does not bind nonparties. But the courts generally
4
answer “yes,” based on the idea that no reasons sufficiently justify retrying the same issue as long as the class representative adequately
5
represented the absentee in the certification attempt. Now the U.S.
Supreme Court stands poised to enter the fray via the controversial
6
Baycol case.
This Essay tackles Baycol’s central question of whether, after a
denial of class certification, preclusion can reach an absentee. Although this question is central in many cases, only occasional class actions will present it cleanly. On the one hand, many cases will fall
beyond the reach of preclusion because some doctrinal requirement,
7
as measured by the rendering court’s law, is unmet. First, only a final
cial Decisionmaking: Limitations from Jurisdictional Primacy and Intrasuit Preclusion, 63 FLA.
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2011)
(manuscript
at
19),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1658931 (“A court should have authority to determine its
lack of authority. The initial court’s ruling that it lacks authority should prevent a
second try that presents exactly the same issue.”).
2
See, e.g., ALI, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.11 (2010)
(supporting a rebuttable presumption against aggregate treatment as a matter of comity, but rejecting collateral estoppel because absentees were not parties and because
preclusion would therefore rest on forbidden virtual representation). But see Kevin M.
Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 1016 (2006) (“And if the plaintiff
refiles the case as a class action in state court, it is again subject to removal to federal
court, where preclusion will presumably apply to both jurisdiction and certification
issues.” (citing cautiously In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig.,
333 F.3d 763, 767-69 (7th Cir. 2003))).
3
See ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON
ITS THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 149-69 (2001) (“As a general proposition, a
judgment can bind only persons who were before the court.”).
4
See, e.g., In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 593 F.3d 716, 724 (8th Cir.) (finding “that the
parties against whom the rule is asserted are the same parties or parties in privity to
those in the prior action and that their interests have been adequately represented”),
cert. granted sub nom. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 61 (2010); BRIAN ANDERSON &
ANDREW TRASK, THE CLASS ACTION PLAYBOOK 245 (2010). But see J.R. Clearwater Inc.
v. Ashland Chem. Co., 93 F.3d 176, 180 (5th Cir. 1996) (alternative holding) (“It is our
considered view that the wide discretion inherent in the decision as to whether or not
to certify a class dictates that each court—or at least each jurisdiction—be free to make
its own determination in this regard.”).
5
See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 3, at 29-38. The same issue can arise from
state court denials of certification. Compare Johnson v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc., 83 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 607, 618-19 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (refusing preclusion, but in a case involving
an earlier federal court denial), with Daboub v. Bell Gardens Bicycle Club, Inc., No.
B200685, 2008 WL 4648797, at *4-6 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2008) (applying preclusion
by earlier state court denial and rejecting Johnson’s dictum).
6
Smith, 131 S. Ct. at 61. The Court held oral argument on January 18, 2011.
7
See Canady v. Allstate Ins. Co., 282 F.3d 1005, 1014 (8th Cir. 2002); KEVIN M.
CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.6 (2d ed. 2009) (recognizing, within
limits, the ability of a sovereign to control the scope of the preclusive effects of its
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8

judgment is binding. Second, only issues actually litigated and de9
termined in a manner essential to the judgment are binding. Third
and most pertinently, the issues in the two suits must be the same,
which is a requirement with a strict meaning that demands that the
10
factual or legal issues be identical. Preclusion will extend neither to
11
a new situation in which the facts have changed nor to another jurisdiction with a class action rule that differs in writing or in applica12
tion. On the other hand, some class action certification decisions
can satisfy all these requirements of preclusion, a situation that prevails more readily between courts in the same system, but possibly
could arise between federal and state courts or between different
states when certification presents itself identically under the second
13
sovereign’s laws. Still, the central question may nevertheless sink toward obscurity if matters such as interjurisdictional injunctive powers
complicate the procedural setting.
This Essay assumes a certification decision satisfying those requirements of preclusion. Thereupon it cleanly asks whether the
courts’ judgments); infra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing the analogous
choice of law for jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction). In the case first discussed in
the text below, the court correctly observed, but confusedly explained, that “federal
law regarding collateral estoppel will be applied to the present case.” Murray v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., No. 09-05744, 2010 WL 3490214, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2010) (involving a class action certification decision in a CAFA action); cf. In re Baycol, 593 F.3d
at 721, 724 (incorporating state preclusion law as federal common law and calling incorporation the usual practice, but indicating that the court would not incorporate
state law that was less preclusive than federal res judicata law). On the governing law
for ordinary res judicata, see generally Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,
531 U.S. 497 (2001), and Patrick Woolley, The Sources of Federal Preclusion Law After Semtek, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 527 (2003).
8
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 cmt. g (1982); see also Kara M.
Moorcroft, Note, The Path to Preclusion: Federal Injunctive Relief Against Nationwide Classes
in State Court, 54 DUKE L.J. 221, 239 (2004) (“[T]he certification decision seems ‘final’
enough for purposes of the relitigation exception.”). As to finality, note that a class
certification decision is now appealable, in the appellate court’s discretion, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). See generally Barry Sullivan & Amy Kobelski Trueblood, Rule 23(f): A Note on Law and Discretion in the Courts of Appeals, 246 F.R.D. 277
(2008) (examining in detail the substance, origin, and application of the Rule).
9
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982); Moorcroft, supra note 8, at
248-49.
10
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. c (1982); Moorcroft, supra
note 8, at 242-48.
11
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. c (1982); CLERMONT, supra
note 7, § 5.3, at 329, 332-33.
12
See In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134
F.3d 133, 146 (3d Cir. 1998) (refusing to preclude a state court action involving a different class action rule).
13
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 cmt. e (1982) (applying federal
legal determinations to a state setting).
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denial of certification in action A can, to any degree, preclude certification in an action B brought by someone who was an adequately
14
represented absentee in that prior action.
I. LEADING CASES ON CERTIFICATION PRECLUSION
A. Murray v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
A straightforward presentation of the question arises when res judicata comes as a defense in the second class action. In Murray v.
15
Sears, Roebuck & Co., the plaintiff brought a statewide class action
against Sears and Electrolux Home Products under California’s consumer protection statutes. The essential allegation was that Sears had
marketed Electrolux’s laundry dryers using deceptive trade practices,
which misrepresented the dryers as having a one-hundred-percent
stainless steel drum when in fact the drum contained a nonstainless
steel part. The defendants removed under the Class Action Fairness
16
Act of 2005 (CAFA). Then, in their motion to deny certification, the
defendants invoked collateral estoppel on the basis of a Seventh Circuit decision that had reversed the certification of a similar class ac17
tion against Sears alone.
14

See In re Bayshore Ford Trucks Sales, Inc., 471 F.3d 1233, 1245 (11th Cir. 2006)
(“Here, the district court refused to grant class certification in the Bayshore Action because the Dealers failed to demonstrate that they would be adequate class representatives, a prerequisite to certification under Rule 23(a)(4). Once this decision was made,
Westgate became a stranger to the Bayshore Action.”). Thus, if the first court decides
that the plaintiff does not satisfy Rule 23(a)(4), then the certification denial will not be
preclusive. Otherwise, the question of adequacy is open only on collateral attack and
hence should be limited to due process adequacy. See RICHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN
KAPLAN & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE
907-10 (10th ed. 2010) (discussing the screening role of Federal Rule 23 and its state
counterparts). The preclusion should extend, under a conservative approach, to all
persons who were adequately represented with respect to the same issue and also were
described as being within the proposed but rejected class. Cf. Crown, Cork & Seal Co.
v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353-54 (1983) (extending tolling “‘to all asserted members of
the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a
class action’” (quoting Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974))).
15
No. 09-05744, 2010 WL 2898291 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2010). I am indebted to J.
Russell Jackson, Preclusive Effect of Class Certification Denial, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 16, 2010, at
26 (favoring application of res judicata), for drawing my attention to this case.
16
28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2006).
17
Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 06C1999, 2007 WL 3232491, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2007) (certifying this CAFA class action, which Sears had removed
from Illinois state court), rev’d, 547 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J.) (denying class
action while incorrectly describing the case as an original federal action), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 90 (2009). On remand, the district court retained jurisdiction over the indi-
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That Seventh Circuit decision, Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
had denied class certification for a multistate class action that would
have included purchasers in California. The appellate court had
found “no common issues of law [or fact] because there did not appear to be a single understanding of the significance of labeling or
18
advertising of the allegedly deceptive statements.” Instead, the court
had characterized the concerns of the plaintiff—who had relied on an
advertisement of the “stainless steel drums” to conclude that the
19
drums would not leave rust stains on clothes—to be “idiosyncratic.”
Although Martin Murray was neither a named plaintiff nor a witness in the Illinois federal class action, the federal district judge in
California accepted the collateral estoppel argument of the two defendants. Thus, she denied class certification in the new class action.
First, the judge found the requirements for issue preclusion were met.
She found, in particular, the pertinent legal and factual issues to be
identical, having recognized that estoppel would not apply unless the
20
same issue arose in both suits. Second, the judge rejected the plain21
tiff’s argument that he was a stranger to the prior action. Admittedly, collateral estoppel required adequate representation in the prior
vidual plaintiff’s action but dismissed it as moot after the plaintiff refused a full settlement; the Seventh Circuit affirmed on February 12, 2010. Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 595 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J.). On remand, the district court
discretionarily denied an injunction against bringing state class actions and left the defendant to invoke collateral estoppel; the Seventh Circuit reversed on November 2,
2010, holding Sears to be entitled to an injunction that would protect it from “settlement extortion” in the form of plaintiffs’ pursuing extensive discovery and huge recovery in class actions brought in multiple states. Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
624 F.3d 842, 843, 848 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J.) (characterizing “this third appeal
[as] arising out of a near-frivolous class action suit by Steven Thorogood”).
18
Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 393 (7th Cir. 2010) (summarizing the
Thorogood decision).
19
Thorogood, 547 F.3d at 747.
20
See Murray, 2010 WL 2898291, at *4 (finding that the issues were sufficiently
identical in the Thorogood action to justify collateral estoppel). Mr. Murray subsequently amended the complaint to avoid collateral estoppel by convincing the court that his
action had become sufficiently different from Thorogood. See Murray v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., No. 09-05744, 2010 WL 3490214, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2010). But that nonappealable success prompted the Seventh Circuit to enjoin Mr. Murray’s further pursuit of the class action in California. See Thorogood, 624 F.3d at 854 (deciding that the
amended complaint still fell within the reach of collateral estoppel because it presented the same issue of commonality), reh’g denied, 627 F.3d 289, 292-93 (7th Cir.
2010) (rejecting a petition that attacked “the Panel’s role as the self-assured Simon
Cowell of the Circuits”). That outcome left the Murray plaintiff in the position of filing
an amicus brief in the Baycol litigation. See Brief of Steven J. Thorogood & Martin
Murray as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 61
(2010) (No. 09-1205).
21
Murray, 2010 WL 2898291, at *5.
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suit, but the judge found that Murray had received adequate representation in Illinois because (1) the Illinois district court had so found
22
in certifying the class; (2) the parties in California had not “seriously
contested” the point, presumably because the plaintiff’s counsel clear23
ly had done an adequate job; and (3) the same lead counsel had
brought both actions, even if this made the second class action “appear to be an example of ‘deliberate maneuvering to avoid the effects
24
of’ Thorogood.”
B. In re Baycol Products Litigation
The same question of preclusion can arise in connection with an injunction in the first court prohibiting putative class members from
bringing new class actions. That situation describes the Baycol litigation,
25
coming out of the Eighth Circuit and now before the Supreme Court.
Here the first class action involved plaintiff George McCollins
seeking in 2001 to represent a West Virginia class against the makers
of Baycol, an anticholesterol drug. The defendants removed on the
basis of diversity. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the action with thousands of similar cases in the District of Minne26
sota for pretrial proceedings. In 2008, upon the defendants’ motion,
22

See id. The Murray court relied on the district court’s certification in Thorogood,
2007 WL 3232491, at *3. This alternative holding in Murray is a suspect application of
collateral estoppel against the victorious party. See LaBuhn v. Bulkmatic Transp. Co.,
865 F.2d 119, 122 (7th Cir. 1988) (dictum) (“[A] finding which a party had no incentive (other than fear of collateral estoppel) to appeal, because he won, has no collateral estoppel effect.”); CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 3, at 139. Moreover, it rests on a
finding rendered nonessential by reversal. See id. at 127-29. But the earlier case of In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Products Liability Litigation, 333 F.3d 763, 769 (7th Cir.
2003), had likewise looked to just such a flimsy finding of adequacy. Indeed, In re Baycol Products Litigation, 593 F.3d 716, 724-25 (8th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Smith v.
Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 61 (2010), took this dangerous approach further by looking to
the prior court’s assumption of adequacy in the course of denying certification for lack
of commonality. Even putting these basic mistakes in applying res judicata aside, there
remains the more fundamental concern of using a finding of adequate representation
to cut off an attack for inadequate representation. See generally Henry Paul Monaghan,
Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 1148 (1998); Patrick Woolley, Collateral Attack and the Role of Adequate Representation
in Class Suits for Money Damages, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 917 (2010).
23
Murray, 2010 WL 2898291, at *5.
24
Id. (quoting Tice v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 162 F.3d 966, 971 (7th Cir. 1998)). Later
the Seventh Circuit found that the representation in fact “was adequate (it was energetic and pertinacious to a fault).” Thorogood, 624 F.3d at 853.
25
In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 593 F.3d 716 (8th Cir.) (Murphy, J.), cert. granted sub
nom. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 61 (2010).
26
Id. at 720.
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the presiding judge denied certification for McCollins’s class, pointing to
27
the predominance of individual issues of showing harm or injury.
Two of the absentees, Smith and Sperlazza, had brought the
28
second class action in West Virginia state court in late 2001. They
sought to represent a West Virginia class and made allegations similar
29
to McCollins’s, but structured the action to defeat diversity. They
moved for certification in the state court in late 2008.
Defendant Bayer Corporation then moved in the District of Minnesota to enjoin Smith and Sperlazza from relitigating the certification issue in the West Virginia state court. The federal district court
30
granted the injunction. Although granting an injunction raises is31
sues concerning the Anti-Injunction Act as well as the existence of
32
personal jurisdiction over the absentees sufficient to enjoin them,
the central issue—and the concern of this Essay—remains the permis33
sibility of precluding absentees. “The district court’s injunction was
27

In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 265 F.R.D. 453, 456-58 (D. Minn. 2008). The judge
also granted summary judgment against McCollins on his individual claim, because
McCollins sought only refunds for economic loss and failed to show that Baycol was
different from what he had bargained for. Id. at 458-60. There was no appeal.
28
In re Baycol, 593 F.3d at 720.
29
Again, the Eighth Circuit took a lax approach to the requirements of res judicata. See supra note 22. Here the second action had some different allegations, such as
adding a claim for fraud, but the court brushed this point aside. “The same cause of
action framed in terms of a new legal theory is still the same cause of action.” In re Baycol, 593 F.3d at 723 n.5 (quoting Canady v. Allstate Ins. Co., 282 F.3d 1005, 1015 (8th
Cir. 2002)). But the Canady court was discussing claim preclusion. The Baycol court
picked up this faulty argument directly from the defendant’s brief. See Brief of Defendant-Appellee Bayer Corp. at 24, In re Baycol, 593 F.3d 716 (No. 09-1069). However,
the defendant seemed to back away from this argument in its Brief in Opposition to
Petition for Certiorari at 19-20, Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 61 (2010) (No. 091205) (suggesting that issue preclusion—not claim preclusion—is presented in Smith),
and abandoned it in the Brief for Respondent at 30-31, Smith, 131 S. Ct. 61 (No. 091205) (arguing directly that the issue was the same).
30
In re Baycol Prods. Litig., No. 02-0199, 2008 WL 7425712, at *7 (D. Minn. Dec.
9, 2008).
31
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006).
32
Compare Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 806-14 (1985) (requiring
some equivalent of personal jurisdiction over out-of-state class members), with In re
Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133, 141 (3d
Cir. 1998) (finding that absentees could not be subjected to the court’s injunctive
power for lack of minimum contacts).
33
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Smith v. Bayer on these obscurely
phrased questions:
1. Among the elements for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to be used in
support of the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act are requirements that the state parties sought to be estopped are the same parties or in
privity with parties to the prior federal litigation and that issues necessary to
the resolution of the proceedings are also identical. In determining whether
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proper if collateral estoppel would bar respondents from seeking cer34
tification of a West Virginia economic loss class in state court.”
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. It conceded that Smith and Sperlazza had not received notice or an opportunity to opt out because
McCollins’s class had never attained certification, but held that
35
McCollins had adequately represented them. Smith and Sperlazza
36
had enjoyed the opportunities to intervene and to appeal. If left
unbound, absentees could keep trying for certification until they got
some anomalous court to certify—perhaps in a nationwide class action
that would erase all the prior losses—even though a contrary decision
37
on certification would have bound the defendants. Finally, the dispute involved whether to bind the two new plaintiffs on certification,
not on the merits. Smith and Sperlazza “are still free to pursue individual claims in state court. . . . The protections available to [them] in
the context of an adverse certification ruling include their right to
adequate representation, their ability to appeal, and the fact that the
38
decision still allows them to pursue their individual claims.”
issues are identical, courts have also recognized that state courts should have
discretion to apply their own procedural rules in a manner different from
their federal counterparts. Can the district court’s injunction be affirmed
when neither the parties sought to be estopped nor the issues presented are
identical?
2. It is axiomatic that everyone should have his own day in court and that one
is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he has not
been made a party by designation or service of process. One exception to this
rule are absent members of a class in a properly conducted class action because of the due-process protections accorded such absent members once
class certification has been granted. Does a district court have personal jurisdiction over absent members of a class for purposes of enjoining them from
seeking class certification in state court when a properly conducted class action had never existed before the district court because it had denied class
certification and due-process protections had never been afforded the absent
members?
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Smith, 131 S. Ct. 61 (No. 09-1205).
34
In re Baycol, 593 F.3d at 721.
35
Id. at 724-25; see also supra note 22.
36
In re Baycol, 593 F.3d at 725.
37
See id. (noting that Smith and Sperlazza “would have been included in a certified class in this case”); see also id. at 723-24 (“Relitigation in state court of whether to
certify the same class rejected by a federal court presented an impermissible ‘heads-Iwin, tails-you-lose situation.’” (quoting In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods.
Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 767 (7th Cir. 2003))).
38
Id. at 725. Actually, all of the points in this paragraph of text, except for adequacy of representation, appeared in the court’s discussion of the first court’s personal
jurisdiction over the absentees, justifying the conclusion that “[t]hese safeguards satisfy
due process and are sufficient to bind them in personam to the district court’s certifi-
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The Supreme Court may very well reverse for, say, lack of authori39
ty to enjoin, or even for inadequacy of representation or failure to
40
satisfy the same-issue requirement. The concern of this Essay, however, is the correctness of the Eighth Circuit’s extension of preclusion
to the absentees.
C. In re Bridgestone/Firestone
In affirming the Baycol injunction, the Eighth Circuit relied heavily on the granddaddy of precedent in this area, In re Bridges41
42
tone/Firestone. Leading up to that “unprecedented decision,” the
Bridgestone/Firestone district court had certified a nationwide class action based on diversity jurisdiction and alleging defects in many models of tires, but the Seventh Circuit had reversed for unmanageabili43
After the filing of many follow-up class actions around the
ty.
country, the defendants asked the district court to enjoin all such class
actions. The district court denied the motion and the Seventh Circuit
reversed again, ruling that the district court should enjoin pursuit of
all duplicative nationwide class actions, but not any statewide class ac44
tions with their different manageability concerns. The district court
45
then did so.
cation decision.” Id. But the Eighth Circuit relied here on the discussion of Bridgestone/Firestone, which appeared to be addressing preclusion, rather than personal jurisdiction. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 768 (“[U]nnamed class members
have the status of parties for many purposes and are bound by the decision whether or
not the court otherwise would have had personal jurisdiction over them.”); see also infra
Part IV (discussing preclusion and jurisdiction’s similarities and differences).
39
See supra notes 14 & 22.
40
See supra notes 12 & 29.
41
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 763.
42
Moorcroft, supra note 8, at 238 (arguing in favor of the decision as protecting federal courts from state intrusion); see also id. at 235 n.75 (discussing the novelty of Bridgestone/Firestone’s approach).
43
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 503 (S.D.
Ind. 2001), rev’d, 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002) (Easterbrook, J.), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
1105 (2003).
44
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 769; see also Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 624 F.3d 842, 844 (7th Cir. 2010) (confirming the Bridgestone/Firestone precedent);
Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide
Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2117 (2008) (favoring issuance of such injunctions and arguing that “due process imposes no obstacle to a federal order enforcing a
denial of certification”). But see Timothy Kerr, Cleaning Up One Mess to Create Another:
Duplicative Class Actions, Federal Courts’ Injunctive Power, and the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 217, 233 (2006) (arguing that issuing an injunction based
on a decision not to certify a class “is an incorrect application of preclusion law”).
45
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1080,
1080 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (adopting the Seventh Circuit’s language in ordering that “‘all
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II. APPROACHING THE CENTRAL QUESTION
A. The American Law Institute’s Route
46

The American Law Institute explicitly rejects Bridgestone/Firestone.
The ALI’s blackletter provides: “A judicial decision to deny aggregate
treatment for a common issue or for related claims by way of a class
action should raise a rebuttable presumption against the same aggre47
gate treatment in other courts as a matter of comity.” Having chosen
to rest this presumption on comity rather than preclusion, the ALI refers to “due-process limitations” in the accompanying comment while
explaining:
The choice of comity rather than preclusion as the focus of this Section stems from the difficulties associated with the latter with respect to a
denial of class certification. The major difficulty arises from the recognition that, as to such a denial, the prospective absent class members have
become neither parties to the proposed class action nor persons with any
attributes of party status (such as the capacity to be bound thereby, as in
a duly certified class action). Nor is there any guarantee that prospective
absent class members even would be aware of the court’s determination
of their ability to assert claims as a class action. The notion that absent
class members could be bound in an issue-preclusion sense with respect
to the seeking of certification in another court, even for the same proposed class action, runs afoul of existing precedents that confine to certain narrowly defined categories the situations in which preclusion can be
extended to reach nonparties. Issue preclusion arising from a denial of
class certification as to would-be absent class members would approach the
48
kind of “virtual representation” disallowed under current law.

I assume that the ALI is not resorting to some abstract party/nonparty
49
line.
It is instead asking whether absentees can and should be
members of the putative national classes . . . , and their lawyers,’ are hereby prohibited
‘from again attempting to have nationwide classes certified over defendants’ opposition with respect to the same claims’” (quoting In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at
769)).
46
See ALI, supra note 2, § 2.11 reporters’ note cmt. b (arguing that the Bridgestone/Firestone court went beyond “the outer bounds for nonparty preclusion”).
47
Id. § 2.11.
48
Id. § 2.11 cmt. b; see also id. reporters’ note cmt. b (citing Taylor v. Sturgell, 553
U.S. 880 (2008), for the rejection of the “virtual representation” principle).
49
See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 9-10 (2002) (“Nonnamed class members,
however, may be parties for some purposes and not for others. The label ‘party’ does
not indicate an absolute characteristic, but rather a conclusion about the applicability
of various procedural rules that may differ based on context.”). For example, the
court theoretically can subject nonnamed class members to discovery as if they were
parties, even before certification. See Joseph H. Park, Precertification, in A PRACTITION-
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treated as privies. Reasonable people could certainly disagree over
whether such a step would optimize class certification’s preclusive effects. Nonetheless, in my opinion, the ALI’s position—or rather its
implication—is wrong in two other respects.
First, the ALI should not be invoking, however obliquely, the Due
Process Clause as a barrier to preclusion. Our law on a judgment’s
preclusive reach as to nonparties does not come close to raising due
process concerns. Res judicata law comprises society’s decision on
how far to go with nonparty preclusion, and society has decided to restrict its reach well short of where due process would step in to prohi50
bit preclusion.
This argument against the ALI begins by defining privy as a label
for those persons who were nonparties to an action but who are nevertheless subject to generally the same rules of res judicata as are the
former parties. The authorization for this treatment lies in some sort
of representational relationship that existed between the nonparty
and a former party. In invoking that authorization to specify which
nonparties to consider privies, res judicata law demands that the policy reasons for binding the nonparty substantially outweigh the social
costs. Indeed, of the various kinds of nonparties who are candidates
for privity, the law designates only those who fall within a set of clear,
simple, and rigid rules that together approximate the outcome of that
balancing of benefits and costs. Moreover, because the various kinds
of privies differ widely, and especially in the nature of the relationship
of privy to party, qualifications and exceptions start sprouting up with
respect to the binding effects of the judgment in order to reflect the
51
privity relationship’s decreasing intensity.
The preclusion of nonparties under res judicata law “does not
contravene the Constitution, because all that due process guarantees
is a full and fair day in court enjoyed in person or through a representa52
tive.” Due process, always reasonable and realistic, therefore allows
53
binding many more nonparties than one might assume.
In this
realm, due process itself requires only “adequate representation”—
ER’S

GUIDE TO CLASS ACTIONS 3, 11-12 (Marcy Hogan Greer ed., 2010) (noting the existence, but rare invocation, of federal courts’ power to do so).
50
See Tice v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 162 F.3d 966 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that adequate representation may satisfy due process but is not enough to create privity).
51
See CLERMONT, supra note 7, § 5.4, at 339-41.
52
Id. at 339.
53
Id. The Supreme Court’s seemingly more demanding decisions that have expressed a right-to-a-day-in-court theme were interpreting statutes or rules or subconstitutional doctrine, not the Due Process Clause. See generally Robert G. Bone, Rethinking
the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193 (1992).
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such that, for class actions, the absentees actually agreed with a named
party as to general objectives and the party vigorously and competently
pursued those objectives, as measured by the outcome of that representa54
tion.
To summarize this response to the ALI’s first error, a court’s
judgment could constitutionally bind all persons whose interests received adequate representation; a court could bind them not only
through the flexible doctrine of stare decisis, but also through the
strictures of res judicata. Society, however, chooses to bind nonparties
by judgment in a narrower fashion—and expresses this choice in its
res judicata law. Res judicata binds “only those nonparties closely related to the representative party or, as the law phrases it, those in priv55
ity with the party.” That is, privity requires adequate representation
plus something else. That something might be a relationship sufficiently ensuring alignment and protection of interests, or some sort of
affirmative conduct signifying consent to representation. The question before us, then, is one of res judicata, not one of due process.
Second, by its reference to virtual representation, the ALI signaled
56
its heavy reliance on the intervening precedent of Taylor v. Sturgell.
The ALI’s deliberations had started with a draft that provided for issue
57
preclusion. Taylor led the ALI to reconsider this draft: “Informed by
the Taylor Court’s analysis of the outer bounds for nonparty preclusion, this Section rejects the Bridgestone/Firestone court’s pre-Taylor view
of the issue-preclusive effect that may properly flow from a denial of
58
class certification.” Although the ALI was wise to look to a precedent
59
that refined privity rather than exploring due process, it was wrong

54

See 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1789 (3d ed. 2005) (“[A] judgment in a class or representative action may bind
members of the class who were not parties to the suit provided their interests were
adequately represented.”). See generally Woolley, supra note 22, at 921-49 (discussing
the function and contours of the adequacy of representation requirement).
55
CLERMONT, supra note 7, § 5.4, at 339.
56
553 U.S. 880, 900 (2008) (holding that federal res judicata law does not bind on
the basis of virtual representation, but instead requires, in addition to alignment of
interests, that “either the party understood herself to be acting in a representative capacity or the original court took care to protect the interests of the nonparty”).
57
See ALI, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.12 (Discussion
Draft 2006) (“A judicial decision to deny aggregate treatment for a common issue
should have issue-preclusive effect as to the bases for that decision in other
courts . . . .”).
58
ALI, supra note 2, § 2.11 reporters’ note cmt. b.
59
See FIELD ET AL., supra note 14, at 760-61 (summarizing and excerpting the Taylor case to focus on privity).
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to view Taylor as forbidding res judicata’s application to a denial of class
action certification. Taylor counsels caution in extending res judicata,
but it does not forbid its application in the Bridgestone/Firestone situation.
Taylor recognized that “the rule against nonparty preclusion is
60
subject to exceptions” —albeit quite limited and rigidly defined ex61
ceptions. The ALI read that recognition very cautiously: “The Court
hastened to underscore, however, that those exceptions ‘delineate
discrete’ situations that ‘apply in “limited circumstances,”’ none of
which extend generally to the situation of a would-be absent class
62
member with respect to a denial of class certification.” The better
reading of Taylor is that it stands for a conservative approach to creating extensions to privity and sets up some minimum requirements for
63
them, but that it does not rule out looking among the existing categories of privies for one that includes a seemingly new situation.
How much nonparty preclusion does Taylor permit? Privies include persons whom a party actually represented in the litigation, thus
including beneficiaries represented by a trustee or executor, as well as
class action members adequately represented by their class represent64
ative. Yet privity does not reach all persons adequately represented by
parties. Taylor held that preclusion does not extend to virtual representation, which entails merely common interests shared by party and

60

Taylor, 553 U.S. at 893.
See id. at 901 (“Preclusion doctrine, it should be recalled, is intended to reduce
the burden of litigation on courts and parties. ‘In this area of the law,’ we agree, ‘crisp
rules with sharp corners are preferable to a round-about doctrine of opaque standards.’” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bittinger v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 123 F.3d 877, 881 (6th Cir. 1997))).
62
ALI, supra note 2, § 2.11 reporters’ note cmt. b (quoting Taylor, 553 U.S. at 898
(quoting Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 n.2 (1989))).
63
See Taylor, 553 U.S. at 900-01 (reviewing the recognized extensions of privity
resting on adequate representation). In a critical passage, the Taylor Court identified
the following required protections, which are at least “grounded in due process”:
61

A party’s representation of a nonparty is “adequate” for preclusion purposes
only if, at a minimum: (1) the interests of the nonparty and her representative are aligned, see Hansberry [v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940)]; and (2) either
the party understood herself to be acting in a representative capacity or the
original court took care to protect the interests of the nonparty, see Richards
[v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 801-02 (1996)] . . . . In addition, adequate
representation sometimes requires (3) notice of the original suit to the persons alleged to have been represented, see Richards, 517 U.S., at 801. In the
class-action context, these limitations are implemented by the procedural safeguards contained in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
Id.

64

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 41–42 (1982).
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65

nonparty. Instead, the required relationship must be closer. Taylor
thus drew a line. The task is to determine on which side of the line
adequately represented absentees fall with respect to a class action
certification denial.
Just as the answer to this central question does not lie in the Due
Process Clause, it does not lie in a reference to Taylor. The answer instead lies in deciding whether the law should choose to treat the absentees as privies. And that choice rests on policy and precedent.
B. Delineating the Reach of Privity
As conceded above, reasonable people may disagree over how,
from a policy perspective, class certification’s preclusive effects may be
optimized based on costs and benefits. The cases above developed the
arguments on the two sides.
Before assessing the costs and benefits, one should recognize
anew that the dispute over preclusion in the subsequent class action
concerns preclusion as to certification rather than as to the merits.
The absentee does not risk losing the individual claim, but only the
66
“right” to bring a class action. However, that right is one that belongs to society; it is not a property interest of any one individual. Society should have concerns when everyone loses in advance the right
to bring a class action, but society should worry less after someone has
litigated the propriety of a class action for a particular set of claims. Indeed, society could defensibly conclude that absentees lose the “privilege” (and windfall returns) of bringing a class action after an adequate
representative has unsuccessfully litigated the class certification question. Putting that qualification aside and assuming adequate representation in the initial class action, the two sides’ arguments run as follows.
Proponents of preclusion argue that it would be, on balance, efficient and fair because preclusion (1) avoids wasteful relitigation and
inconsistent adjudications, as it extends the power of the rendering
court to dispose of the dispute; (2) provides repose and protects reliance interests; and (3) is fairer to class action defendants in that it
(a) avoids imposing the burdens of relitigating, (b) prevents absentees
from searching for the anomalous court that will certify the class, and
(c) treats putative class members the same as the defendant.

65

Taylor, 553 U.S. at 901.
See Brief for Respondent, supra note 29, at 44-50; Robert G. Bone, Procedure, Participation, Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1011 (2010).
66
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Opponents of preclusion argue that nonpreclusion would be, on
balance, efficient and fair because it (1) allows a fresh look in pursuit
of the right result, although the availability of nonmutual issue preclusion against the defendant means that the wrong result as to certification might come to prevail; and (2) is fairer to absentees, who did not
receive notice or an opportunity to opt out, even if they had the opportunities to intervene and to appeal.
67
Thus, the argument for preclusion is not insubstantial at all. It
explains the weight of precedent favoring preclusion. Even the ALI
agreed as to policy by conceding: “Short of issue preclusion . . . the
court in the subsequent proceeding should generally exercise its discretion to avoid unnecessary friction with the court that initially de68
nied class certification.”
Nevertheless, the costs on neither side are readily quantifiable. If
a court eyed these costs without a proplaintiff or prodefendant bias,
and without any unauthorized policy bias that favors or disfavors class
actions, the court could not say with definitiveness which side has the
stronger argument. Taylor did urge courts not to make close cost69
benefit calls in favor of nonparty preclusion. Thus, as the ALI concluded, Taylor counsels against creating a new category of privies to
extend the preclusive effect of the denial of class action certification
to absentees.
There is, however, a route around Taylor, one that courts and parties have yet to discover. Blazing that path requires finding an analogous provision among the existing categories of precluded privies—
or parties whose treatment resembles that of privies. The analogy involves the res judicata law that treats jurisdictional findings.

67

See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 5-10, Smith, 131 S. Ct. 61 (No. 09-1205) (developing the argument for preclusion); Moorcroft, supra note 8, at 223-29 (developing
a similar argument).
68
ALI, supra note 2, § 2.11 cmt. b. The ALI’s reliance on comity would not, however, provide sufficient assurance against relitigation. Stare decisis fails as well when
the second class action is outside the domain of the first court.
69
See, e.g., 553 U.S. at 906 (noting that, under similar circumstances, “courts
should be cautious about finding preclusion”).
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III. A JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATION’S PRECLUSIVE EFFECTS

70

A. Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction
The doctrine of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction treats a matter somewhat different from the normal application of res judicata: it
does not involve preclusive use of determinations embedded in a valid
judgment, but instead involves preclusive use of prior determinations
underlying a judgment in order to establish the judgment’s validity.
That is to say, an affirmative ruling on subject-matter jurisdiction, territorial jurisdiction, or adequate notice can foreclose relitigation of
that ruling—and thereby preclude the parties from attacking the re71
sultant judgment by raising that ground in subsequent litigation.
It is true that if a defendant faces suit in a court that lacks jurisdiction or fails to give notice, the defendant ordinarily does not have to
respond in any way. If the defendant takes no action of any kind in
response to the suit, the court may enter a default judgment, but the
judgment will be invalid. If the plaintiff should attempt to assert
rights based on that judgment in a later suit involving the same defendant, the defendant ordinarily can avoid the effects of the judgment by showing that its entry was without jurisdiction or notice. The
defendant, in person or through a representative, has the right to a
day in some court on the question of the fundamental authority of the
72
court that rendered the earlier judgment.
Alternatively, the defendant may choose to raise the jurisdiction
or notice issue in the initial action by going before the challenged
court itself. Then, the court that otherwise lacks authority could conceivably have jurisdiction to determine whether it has jurisdiction and
whether its notice was good, and its affirmative rulings on such questions could bind the defendant so as to preclude relitigation of the
same questions. The theory would be that because the essential issue
of jurisdiction or notice was actually litigated and determined, even if
erroneously, the defendant should not be allowed to relitigate the
same issue in subsequent litigation. The defendant’s appearance in
the challenged court would then be the defendant’s day in court on
70

This Part draws heavily from CLERMONT, supra note 7, § 5.1, and Clermont, supra note 1, at 16-21.
71
See generally CLERMONT, supra note 7, §§ 4.4, 5.1(A)(3); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
& MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 16, at 95-96 (6th ed. 2002) (“If the jurisdiction of a federal court is questioned, the court has the power, subject to review, to
determine the jurisdictional issue.”).
72
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 65–66 (1982).
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the question of the forum’s authority; the defendant could obtain appellate review of the erroneous ruling, of course, but could not chal73
lenge it by later seeking relief from judgment.
Our law, in fact, accepts this so-called bootstrap principle, and so
allows a court lacking fundamental authority to issue a judgment that
74
will nevertheless be immune from attack in subsequent litigation.
Here the desire for finality outweighs the concern for validity. Indeed,
our law accepts the bootstrap principle’s value of finality with true en75
thusiasm, despite its conflict with the intuitive value of validity.
Jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction constitutes a third body of
res judicata law, distinguishable from claim and issue preclusion, or
perhaps standing separate from res judicata. In particular, despite a
76
similar appearance, it differs importantly from issue preclusion. The
73

This principle has been widely acknowledged. See, e.g., Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S.
106, 116 (1963) (quasi in rem jurisdiction); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 589
(1951) (jurisdiction over status); Chicot Cty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308
U.S. 371, 378 (1940) (subject-matter jurisdiction); Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling
Men’s Ass’n, 283 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1931) (personal jurisdiction); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 10–12 (1982).
74
See Dan B. Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Before Final Judgment, 51 MINN. L. REV. 491, 494-99 (1967) (describing the doctrine and
its operation).
75
Our law applies the principle even more broadly than the foregoing illustration
of actually-litigated-and-determined forum-authority defenses. Strangely, this extension comes in connection with subject-matter jurisdiction, in spite of the traditional
lore about subject-matter jurisdiction’s fundamental importance. On the one hand, an
implicit determination of the unchallenged existence of subject-matter jurisdiction in
any action litigated to judgment by contesting parties has the preclusive consequences
of an actually litigated determination in foreclosing attack on the judgment. See, e.g.,
Chicot Cty., 308 U.S. at 378 (precluding a defaulted defendant from collateral attack on
subject-matter jurisdiction grounds, after other defendants had appeared and litigated
the case without raising subject-matter jurisdiction and after the prior court had canceled the defendants’ bonds); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 (1982).
On the other hand, sometimes the interests inherent in subject-matter jurisdiction are
too important to ignore; even an express finding of subject-matter jurisdiction will not
preclude the parties from attacking the resultant judgment on that ground in special
circumstances, such as where the court plainly lacked subject-matter jurisdiction or
where the judgment substantially infringes on the authority of another court or agency.
See Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 439 (1940) (holding that a state court proceeding
could not preclude a bankruptcy proceeding); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 cmts. c, e (1982); Karen Nelson Moore, Collateral Attack on Subject Matter Jurisdiction: A Critique of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 534,
543 (1981) (“[T]here is no substantial reason to depart from the application of general
res judicata principles to collateral attacks upon subject matter jurisdiction.”).
76
For a fuller discussion of the differences between the doctrines, see CLERMONT,
supra note 7, § 5.1(A)(3), at 307:
First, issue preclusion requires a valid prior judgment. Jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction does not require validity, but instead works to make invulnerable what could otherwise be an invalid judgment. Second, issue preclu-
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reason for difference is that the conflicting policies that shape the
doctrine of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction are unique, and so
they produce a unique set of rules. For related reasons tied to the notion that this doctrine defines the judgment even more intimately
than does the rest of res judicata, the federal common law of jurisdic77
tion to determine jurisdiction applies to a prior federal judgment.
B. Jurisdiction to Determine No Jurisdiction

78

Can a court’s ruling that it lacks jurisdiction have preclusive effect? Courts and scholars have elaborated this question less thoroughly than the jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction doctrine, and thus
the details of its answer remain more controversial. Nevertheless, it is
clear that there exists, at least to some degree, a doctrine of jurisdiction to determine no jurisdiction.
In elaborating the related doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court built upon the premise of a jurisdiction-todetermine-no-jurisdiction doctrine. In Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil
79
Co., the federal district court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The understanding was that the personal jurisdiction decision
would have a binding effect, so as to prevent the plaintiff from suing
sion applies only in a subsequent action, and so does not apply on a motion
for relief from judgment, which is technically a continuation of the initial action. Jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction, however, does apply to preclude a
validity attack by such a motion, as well as by the other methods for relief from
judgment. Third, issue preclusion usually does not work to bind the party
prevailing on the issue. Jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction will preclude
the successful plaintiff if the unsuccessful defendant would be precluded on
the jurisdiction or notice issue. Fourth, issue preclusion applies only to issues
actually litigated and determined. Jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction
sometimes applies to issues of subject-matter jurisdiction that were not litigated at all, and even against a defaulting party. Fifth, and most importantly,
special policies and concerns are at work with respect to the jurisdiction and
notice defenses, so the law needs to develop special rules and exceptions for
jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction.
77

See Harper Macleod Solicitors v. Keaty & Keaty, 260 F.3d 389, 396-98 (5th Cir.
2001) (discussing the choice-of-law principles to apply under these circumstances,
while distinguishing Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001)).
78
See CLERMONT, supra note 7, § 4.4(B)(3), at 297 (“Passing beyond the res judicata effects of affirmative rulings on forum-authority, what if the initial court decides that
it lacks jurisdiction or failed to give notice? That is, can a court, which is admittedly
without authority to enter a valid judgment, make any rulings that have preclusive effect? Yes.”).
79
526 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1999) (holding that a federal court can skip over a subjectmatter jurisdiction defense to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction); see also Clermont,
supra note 1, at 21-31 (delineating nonbypassable and resequenceable defenses).
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repetitively. The parties as well as the Justices on oral argument as80
sumed the existence of some intersystem preclusion. The Court itself clearly envisaged intersystem preclusion, just as Justice Ginsburg
suggested in her opinion for the unanimous Court: “If a federal court
dismisses a removed case for want of personal jurisdiction, that determination may preclude the parties from relitigating the very same
81
personal jurisdiction issue in state court.”
Moreover, intersystem preclusion was a necessary implication of
Ruhrgas’s holding, because allowing the Texas state court to reconsider the federal courts’ decision on personal jurisdiction would undercut the Court’s decision extending hypothetical jurisdiction. Preclusion was also necessary because otherwise the judgment would mean
almost nothing. As Justice Ginsburg declared during oral argument,
“[t]he Federal court would be accomplishing nothing [if it did not]
82
bind the State court.” Accordingly, under the federal preclusion law
applicable to a federal judgment, the federal judgment in the defendant’s favor would prevent later suit in a Texas state court for lack of
83
personal jurisdiction.
Indeed, a court should have authority to determine its own lack of
authority. The initial court’s ruling that it lacks authority should prevent a second try that presents exactly the same issue. The initial ruling will defeat jurisdiction in any attempt to sue again in a second
84
court where the same jurisdictional issue arises, even when one court

80

See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, 8-9, 13, 30-31, Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. 574 (No.
98-470), 1999 WL 183813 (suggesting that the issue was one of potential conflict between federal and Texas state courts).
81
Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 585 (citing Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Ass’n, 283
U.S. 522, 524-27 (1931), with the parenthetical to Baldwin that “personal jurisdiction
ruling has issue-preclusive effect”).
82
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 80, at 9.
83
See 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4436 & n.33 (2d ed. 2002) (collecting cases); cf. Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of
Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 21 (2001) (noting
the novelty of the Ruhrgas approach); David L. Shapiro, Justice Ginsburg’s First Decade:
Some Thoughts About Her Contributions in the Fields of Procedure and Jurisdiction, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 21, 30 (2004) (finding some “difficulty with [the] reasoning” in Ruhrgas).
84
See, e.g., Coors Brewing Co. v. Méndez-Torres, 562 F.3d 3, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2009)
(noting the preclusive effect of the jurisdictional determination and highlighting its
contrast with other preclusion doctrines), abrogated on other grounds, Levin v. Commerce
Energy, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2323 (2010); Hill v. Potter, 352 F.3d 1142, 1146 (7th Cir. 2003)
(identifying jurisdictional determinations as “an important and applicable exception”
to the rule that dismissals without prejudice are not preclusive); Bromwell v. Mich.
Mut. Ins. Co., 115 F.3d 208, 212-13 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Once the [district] court determined that it lacked jurisdiction . . . that determination had a preclusive effect.”);
Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 702 F.2d 1189, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (same).
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85

is state and the other federal. One argument for assigning at least
this minimal preclusive effect to a court’s ruling as to jurisdiction is
that leaving it with no preclusive effect might raise the constitutional
86
problem associated with advisory opinions.
More to the point,
common sense supports preclusion on the threshold issue: to prevent
a party—who chose the court that ruled against its own authority—
from litigating the same point repetitively. So, for this limited purpose, the dismissal is a valid judgment.
Naturally, there should be limits to the preclusive effects. Dismissal on a jurisdictional defense does not bar a second action in an ap87
propriate court that presents different jurisdictional issues. Further,
the initial court’s negative ruling on the jurisdictional issue should not
have normal issue-preclusive effects in a later action, and so should
not preclude some similar issue that arises on the merits of the same
88
or any other claim. For such purposes, the prior judgment is invalid.
After all, the initial court was supposed to be exercising only its juris89
diction to determine jurisdiction. Many good reasons support such
limits on preclusion, including not only the notion that limited juris85

See, e.g., ASARCO, Inc. v. Glenara, Ltd., 912 F.2d 784, 787 (5th Cir. 1990)
(“[T]he Louisiana courts would be bound by our ruling that defendants had insufficient contacts with Louisiana to satisfy the federal due process clause requisites for personal jurisdiction.”); Eaton v. Weaver Mfg. Co., 582 F.2d 1250, 1255 (10th Cir. 1978)
(“We must agree that the merits of the issue of personal jurisdiction over Volkswagen
South was decided by the unappealed state court judgments and that they bar relitigation of the jurisdictional issue in the instant cases.”).
86
See Michael J. Edney, Comment, Preclusive Abstention: Issue Preclusion and Jurisdictional Dismissals After Ruhrgas, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 193, 212-13 (2001) (discussing the Article III concerns inherent in rulings that have no preclusive effect).
87
See Hughes v. United States, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 232, 237 (1866).
88
See, e.g., Anusbigian v. Trugreen/Chemlawn, Inc., 72 F.3d 1253, 1257 (6th Cir.
1996) (“[C]ontrary to the plaintiff’s fear, expressed in his brief, that he might be foreclosed from seeking damages in state court under the doctrines of res judicata or ‘law of
the case,’ the remand order forecloses nothing except further litigation of his claim in
federal court.”); United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994)
(“[A]lthough Ritchie’s clients were barred (after Judge Jarvis’s ruling) from relitigating whether their motion to quash could be heard before the IRS brought an enforcement action, Judge Hull was not bound by any factual findings made by Judge
Jarvis for the limited purpose of considering the jurisdictional challenge . . . .”); ByProd Corp. v. Armen-Berry Co., 668 F.2d 956, 962 (7th Cir. 1982) (“Armen-Berry can
sue By-Prod and Schiff under Article 14 of the Illinois Criminal Code in an Illinois
court, and that court will not be bound by our reading of the Illinois law of punitive
damages.”). But see, e.g., Matosantos Commercial Corp. v. Applebee’s Int’l, Inc., 245
F.3d 1203, 1209 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that an issue decided in a personal jurisdiction dismissal was preclusive on the merits in a second suit).
89
See Idleman, supra note 83, at 57-63 (identifying carefully the outer bounds of a
court’s inherent power to determine its own jurisdiction).
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diction should yield limited effects, but also the fact that the truncated
procedure for deciding jurisdiction weighs against carrying jurisdic90
tional determinations over to affect the merits.
The main idea coming from the urge for preclusion and a sense
for its limits is that a prior court lacking jurisdiction should be able to
preclude little more than is absolutely necessary. A dismissal for lack
of jurisdiction does not produce a generally valid judgment. Therefore, the rule emerges that the preclusive effect of jurisdiction to determine no jurisdiction reaches no further than the precise issue of
jurisdiction itself, so that a finding of no jurisdiction will not otherwise
91
be binding in any other action.
A few corollaries follow from that basic rule. A determination of
92
no jurisdiction probably should not generate nonmutual preclusion.
Nor should it work to establish, rather than defeat, the jurisdiction of
93
the other court. For example, a finding that a federal court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction because of the nonexistence of some fact
critical to exclusive jurisdiction should not force a state court to accept
94
jurisdiction. Even though this limit on preclusion might lead to awk95
ward situations, extending the binding effect of the unempowered
federal court’s dismissal appears unnecessary and hence improper.
Additional arguments for this latter limit on preclusion might be
(1) that the burden of proof for defeating jurisdiction is often lighter
90

See Edney, supra note 86, at 206-22 (cataloging reasons).
See Idleman, supra note 83, at 29 (approving limited preclusive effects); Edney,
supra note 86, at 217-18 (noting the limited scope of the determination). It is true that
18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 83, § 4436, sounds more expansive: “Although a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does not bar a second action as a matter of claim preclusion,
it does preclude relitigation of the issues determined in ruling on the jurisdiction
question.” But in fact the specific discussion and the cases Wright et al. cite conform
to the idea that preclusion extends only to “the same issue of jurisdiction.” Id. at n.3.
But see id. at n.16 (noting the collateral effect of jurisdictional determinations).
92
See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 83, § 4436 (agreeing on the basis of the “importance and sensitivity of jurisdictional limits”).
93
R.G. Barry Corp. v. Mushroom Makers, Inc., 612 F.2d 651, 657 n.10 (2d Cir.
1979), abrogated on other grounds, Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010). But see
Roth v. McAllister Bros., 316 F.2d 143, 145 (2d Cir. 1963) (“[A] tribunal always possesses jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction, and any fact upon which that decision
is grounded may serve as the basis for an estoppel by judgment in any later action.”).
94
Cf. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 645-47 (2006) (stating that
“[w]hile the state court cannot review the decision to remand in an appellate way, it is
perfectly free to reject the remanding court’s reasoning,” but basing the refusal to establish jurisdiction by preclusion on the inability to obtain federal appellate review of
the remand).
95
See Julie Fukes Stewart, Note, “Litigation Is Not Ping-Pong,” Except When It Is: Resolving the Westfall Act’s Circularity Problem, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 1022-25 (2010)
(describing cases that bounce between removal and remand).
91
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than the burden of proof for establishing jurisdiction, and issue prec96
lusion does not apply when the burden increases, and (2) that establishing jurisdiction would usually work to the detriment of the defendant, and issue preclusion normally does not bind the victorious
97
party. These additional arguments are not determinative, however,
because the rules of jurisdiction to determine no jurisdiction might be
98
specially tailored and need not conform to those of issue preclusion.
The jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction doctrine is, however,
not in all respects narrower than issue preclusion. The law’s capability
to shape this special preclusion doctrine also can broaden it. For example, by virtue of jurisdiction to determine no jurisdiction, an unreviewable remand for lack of removal jurisdiction might preclude a
99
subsequent federal action on the same cause, even though an inabili100
ty to obtain appellate review usually defeats issue preclusion.
IV. ANALOGIZING JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATION
TO CLASS CERTIFICATION
Personal jurisdiction authorizes rendering a judgment with preclusive effect. Indeed, jurisdiction over the person is a prerequisite to
giving certain remedies, such as enjoining that person from suing
101
elsewhere.
By contrast, preclusion refers to binding someone to the outcome
of a prior case. The extent of preclusion finds specification through
the law of res judicata. Res judicata thus defines what the judgment
102
decided for the parties and their privies.
Personal jurisdiction and preclusion of privies are different con103
cepts. Jurisdiction is possible without privity, and privity can exist
104
without jurisdiction. The line for personal jurisdiction over absentees
96

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(4) (1982).
See supra note 22 (collecting sources).
98
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
99
See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 83, § 4436 (“Preclusion on the jurisdiction
question should apply both on a subsequent attempt to remove and to an independent
federal filing.”).
100
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(1) (1982).
101
See CLERMONT, supra note 7, §§ 4.2, 5.1(B)(1), 5.7(B).
102
See id. § 5.1(A)(1).
103
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 34(3) (1982) (providing that
a person who is neither party nor privy is beyond preclusion, which would be true even
if personal jurisdiction would have existed).
104
See, e.g., id. §§ 43–44 (providing that a successor in interest to property is a privy
with respect to a judgment determining his predecessor’s interest in that property,
97
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105

tends to coincide with substantive due process, while policy draws
the privity line well short of procedural due process’s requirement of
106
adequate representation.
Nevertheless, personal jurisdiction and preclusion of privies have
a similar flavor and turn on similar considerations. Personal jurisdiction over absentees in a class action and preclusion of them are peculiarly similar notions. The similarity suffices to confuse some courts
107
into mixing them together when discussing a Baycol-type problem.
In certain class action settings, the two concepts begin to merge.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts recognized that personal jurisdiction is
normally a prerequisite for valid judgment, which is in turn a prere108
quisite for preclusion.
But the Court further provided, in the context of a certified class action for damages, that adequately represented
absentees who received notice and had rights to participate and to opt
out were sufficiently subject to personal jurisdiction to authorize a
109
binding judgment on the merits.
That is, certain procedures ensured enough protection to justify both jurisdiction and preclusion.
Shutts suggests the analogy. A denial of personal jurisdiction in an
ordinary lawsuit works much the same as denial of class certification,
because the latter announces that the court will not exercise personal
jurisdiction over the absentees. Finding no jurisdiction means the
court will not issue a valid judgment that supports preclusion. Similarly, denying class certification means the absentees are strangers un-

which would be true even for a yet unborn successor not subject to personal jurisdiction).
105
See CLERMONT, supra note 7, §§ 4.2(B)(1), 4.2(C)(1).
106
See supra text accompanying notes 50-54.
107
See, e.g., supra note 38 (describing the Eighth Circuit’s Baycol discussion). The
parties’ briefs did not help the court untangle the two issues. The defendant phrased
its central argument as follows: “Because Appellants’ Interests Were Fully and Adequately Represented, They Are Bound In Personam by the Denial of Class Certification .
. . .” Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 29, at iv. In the Supreme Court, the defendant did untangle the issues, arguing: “As Adequately Represented Unnamed Parties in McCollins, Petitioners Are Bound by the Denial of Class Certification.” Brief for
Respondent, supra note 29, at iii. The plaintiffs left it a muddle: “Both Due Process
and Preclusion Principles Are Violated by Binding Absent Class Members to a Decision
Denying Class Certification Because They Have Never Received Any Notice or an Opportunity to be Heard or to Opt Out.” Brief for Petitioners at iii, Smith v. Bayer Corp.,
131 S. Ct. 61 (2010) (No. 09-1205).
108
472 U.S. 797, 820-23 (1985) (ruling, in a state plaintiff-class action seeking
money damages for claimants from all over the country and abroad, that the Kansas
court could not apply Kansas law to class members’ claims unrelated to Kansas and
that absent class members need not otherwise be subject to effective service of process
as long as they received notice and had rights to participate and to opt out).
109
See Woolley, supra note 22, at 959-75.
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bound by any judgment in the lawsuit. Therefore, just as the determination of no personal jurisdiction means that there will be little to
no preclusive effect from the judgment, a denial of class certification
means that normally there will be no preclusion as to the class.
Yet, a determination of no personal jurisdiction will have a preclusive effect, albeit a very limited one. The jurisdiction-to-determine-nojurisdiction doctrine stands for the proposition that lack of the normally required personal jurisdiction will not prevent a judgment binding only on the issue of no jurisdiction. In making a determination
that it lacks jurisdiction, a court is indicating that it has enough hold
of the parties to say authoritatively that it has no jurisdiction. The
court can say that with binding effect, even though it in fact lacks jurisdiction to render a valid judgment on the merits. It can thereby accomplish something by its holding and avoid repetitive litigation of
the exact same issue of jurisdiction.
If a court without jurisdiction can bind someone to a finding that
jurisdiction is lacking, a court without authority of a comparable sort
should be able to bind someone to a finding that authority is lacking.
The denial of class certification is a comparable determination of no
authority—arguably it is the only comparable determination of no authority, besides failure to give adequate notice—in that it announces
110
that there will be no valid judgment as to the absent class members.
In other words, the term “jurisdiction” in the name of the jurisdiction-todetermine-no-jurisdiction doctrine means authority prerequisite to validity.
Therefore, a finding of no certification should preclude in the
same way that a finding of no jurisdiction precludes. Moreover, giving
such preclusive effect would serve the same policies of effectuating the
holding and avoiding repetitive litigation. Still, the effect should be
limited to binding only on the factual and legal issues that generated
the no-certification ruling if they arise in a repeated attempt to certify.
Cutting against the analogy is that the determination of no jurisdiction over the defendant binds the ordinary plaintiff, over whom the
111
court in fact has personal jurisdiction.
In the class action setting,
the aim is instead to bind a noncertified class absentee. The response
is fourfold. The first two arguments address the jurisdictional side of
110

Cf. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 831 (1999) (viewing class certification as a matter of statutory standing); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
612 (1997) (treating class certification as “logically antecedent” to jurisdiction).
111
See Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938) (holding that the institution of
a lawsuit subjected the plaintiff to personal jurisdiction for a transactionally related
counterclaim).
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the analogy, while the next two speak to the class action side. Together they establish that whether the person whom the jurisdiction-todetermine-no-jurisdiction doctrine precludes was subject to personal
jurisdiction is irrelevant to determining by analogy the preclusive effect of a denial of class certification.
First, the jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction doctrine might
provide a better analogy than the no-jurisdiction doctrine. When a
court erroneously determines that it has personal jurisdiction, that
finding will bind the defendant over whom the court by hypothesis
has no personal jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction over the bound
party is not a sine qua non. Second, even the jurisdiction-todetermine-no-jurisdiction doctrine gives courts without jurisdiction
the power to preclude parties. A court that determines it has no subject-matter jurisdiction will bind the plaintiff on that point. No form
of jurisdiction with respect to the bound party is a prerequisite.
Third, even if Shutts requires a strange breed of personal jurisdiction over absent plaintiffs to bind them on the merits of a class judgment for damages, that case did not address any requirements for jurisdiction to determine no jurisdiction. A court denying certification,
but having properly conducted a class action to that point, will have
afforded the absentees some procedural protections—albeit mainly
through representation, rather than by notice, participation, or optout safeguards. In fact, one could read the Bridgestone/Firestone line of
cases as ruling that there was therefore sufficient jurisdiction with respect to adequately represented absentees, especially in a federal
court, to bind them to the denial of class certification. Fourth, as already noted, the system can preclude privies not subject to personal ju112
risdiction at all.
The central question is whether the law should
choose to treat the class action absentees as privies. The answer does
not definitively turn on whether personal jurisdiction over them exists.
In sum, the analogy may not be perfect, but it seems strong
enough to conclude that a finding that no class exists should be as
binding as a finding that no jurisdiction exists. The Bridgestone/Firestone progeny therefore could adopt the proposition that certification of a class action is not necessary to render a judgment valid
enough to bind absentees only on the determination of no certification.

112

See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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V. A CLASS ACTION’S PRECLUSIVE EFFECTS
Our law permits an action to be brought by or against named parties as representatives of a class of absent persons similarly situated.
The judgment in such a class action binds all persons included within
113
the class, not just those named as parties.
Class members normally
114
cannot relitigate matters the class representatives have litigated. To
ensure the adequacy of the representation and thereby to obviate the
nonjoined class members’ need for an independent day in court, class
action rules commonly require, as does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), that the court prospectively test commonality, typicality,
and representation by deciding at the outset whether to certify the
case as a class action. Appropriate notice to class members may be required, although it is usually not necessary that a class member actually receive notice in order to be bound by the judgment. On collateral
attack, an absent class member can attack a class action judgment’s
binding effect not only on the usual grounds of lack of jurisdiction
and procedural due process, but also by raising the due process ques115
tion of inadequate representation of the class members’ interests.

113

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41 cmt. e (1982) (noting the
binding effect provided adequacy is found); CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 3, at 16163 (explaining the extension of preclusion to class members); 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 54, § 1789 (exploring the effect of a judgment in a class action); Andrew S.
Tulumello & Mark Whitburn, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Issues in Class Litigation,
in A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 49, at 605, 606-07 (detailing
these rules); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 717, 721-22 (2005) (suggesting the difficulties with applying preclusion in the
class setting). Such res judicata follows only a valid judgment in a certified class action.
It does not provide for preclusion by the affirmative certification decision within the
original class action suit itself. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d
305, 318 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Although the district court’s findings for the purpose of class
certification are conclusive on that topic, they do not bind the fact-finder on the merits.”); Clermont, supra note 1, at 39-40 (explaining that “there simply is no doctrine of
intrasuit res judicata”).
114
Of course, complications exist. For preclusion to take effect, the claims must
be the same in the class action and the later individual action. See Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 880 (1984) (refusing to preclude absent class members from
pursuing different claims in individual actions); 5 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 16:21–:22 (4th ed. 2002) (noting absentees can
bring individual actions on issues that a class could not have raised). And nonmutuality must be extended to absentees gingerly. See Germonprez v. Dir. of Selective Serv.,
318 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1970) (applying preclusion); 5 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra,
§§ 16:27–:30 (illustrating the possible unfairness to the defendant of allowing new
claims to be litigated using collateral estoppel by absentees).
115
See supra note 14.
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This Essay, however, does not treat such matters. It concerns instead the binding effect of a would-be class action that the court refuses to certify. The decisions implicit in a no-certification ruling have
a binding effect in any attempt to sue again in a court where the exact
same issue arises. Of course, the named parties may find themselves
116
bound under the ordinary rules of res judicata.
Additionally, and
less ordinarily, preclusion may extend to the absentees, who would
thus be in privity with the class representatives for that limited purpose. By analogy to the jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction doctrine, the absentees would face preclusion if the exact same issue
arose when they sought certification elsewhere.
By contrast, the decision not to certify should carry no other preclusive effects. Although, just as for the jurisdiction-to-determine-no117
jurisdiction doctrine, courts might sometimes embrace preclusion
too enthusiastically, they are thereby disassociating the limited preclusion from its narrow rationale. For example, a court might conceivably incline toward binding decertified absentees on the merits. That
would be going too far. There should be no preclusion on the me118
rits. The denial of certification makes the absentee a stranger to the
action for all other purposes.
Analogizing this class action question to the jurisdiction-todetermine-no-jurisdiction doctrine bears significant benefits. It suggests a path to preclusion that avoids the natural judicial reluctance to
augment the categories of privies. It reaches the result of preclusion
on certification denial, a result policy suggests and the weight of
precedent accepts. Almost as importantly, the analogy brings with it
all the limits on preclusion associated with the jurisdiction-todetermine-no-jurisdiction doctrine.

116

See, e.g., Canady v. Allstate Ins. Co., 282 F.3d 1005, 1012 (8th Cir. 2002) (involving same named plaintiffs repetitively bringing class actions).
117
See Clermont, supra note 1, at 24-25 (discussing the complexities of intersystem
preclusion in jurisdictional determinations).
118
See, e.g., Muhammad v. Giant Food Inc., 108 F. App’x 757, 765 n.5 (4th Cir.
2004) (observing, when affirming the grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on each of the employees’ individual claims and the declaration of mootness on
a pending class-certification motion: “While the rejection of the named employees’
individual claims is binding as to those employees, it does not preclude later efforts to
certify a class action against Giant or bar any individual claims that might be asserted
in such an action.”).
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CONCLUSION
A denial of certification yields a judgment valid, with respect to
the adequately represented absentees, for the very limited purpose of
preclusion on the same issue of certification. This preclusion works
just like the jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction doctrine. Thus,
it will defeat certification in any attempt to sue again in a court where
the exact same issue arises, but it will have no wider preclusive effects.
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